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Abstract Policy makers often think that creating
more start-up companies will transform depressed
economic regions, generate innovation, and create
jobs. This belief is flawed because the typical start-up is
not innovative, creates few jobs, and generates little
wealth. Getting economic growth and jobs creation
from entrepreneurs is not a numbers game. It is about
encouraging the formation of high quality, high growth
companies. Policy makers should stop subsidizing the
formation of the typical start-up and focus on the subset
of businesses with growth potential. While govern-
ment officials will not be able to ‘‘pick winners,’’ they
can identify start-ups with a low probability of
generating jobs and enhancing economic growth. By
eliminating incentives to create these low probability
companies, policy makers can improve the average
performance of new businesses.
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1 Introduction
Policy makers believe a dangerous myth. They think
that start-up companies are a magic bullet that will
transform depressed economic regions, generate
innovation, create jobs, and conduct all sorts of other
economic wizardry. Leading economist Edward
Lazear (2005, p. 649) has even claimed that ‘‘the
entrepreneur is the single most important player in a
modern economy.’’ So they provide people with
transfer payments, loans, subsidies, regulatory
exemptions, and tax benefits if they start businesses.
Any businesses.
Take, for example, the remarks of former U.S.
President George W. Bush who said, in a speech to
the Small Business Week Conference (Bush 2006):
‘‘Small businesses are vital for our workers…. That’s
why it makes sense to have the small business at the
cornerstone of a pro-growth economic policy…. The
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Small Business Administration is working hard to
make it easier for people to start up companies. We
understand that sometimes people have got a good
idea, but they’re not sure how to get something
started…. And so we’ve doubled the number of small
business loans out of the SBA since I came to office.’’
Or take a speech by British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown to the International Monetary Fund (Brown
1998): ‘‘Britain cannot be properly equipped while
we have productivity levels 40 per cent below
America, and 20 per cent below France and Ger-
many, so over the next year, in partnership with
industry, we intend to examine and begin the task of
dismantling every barrier to productivity, prosperity
and employment creation. That will require policies
to promote entrepreneurship and small business
development.’’
This is bad public policy. Encouraging more and
more people to start businesses won’t enhance
economic growth or create a lot of jobs because
start-ups, in general, aren’t the source of our
economic vitality or job creation.
You might be startled by this position, going, as it
does, against the grain of most popular arguments. It
might even seem illogical to you. After all, compa-
nies like SAP in computer software, Google in
Internet search, and Genentech in biotechnology, are
all examples of wildly successful start-ups. And the
list need not stop there. EasyJet and Wal-Mart were
also start-up companies not too long ago. So, surely,
these companies must have contributed to economic
growth?
2 The economic growth myth
Yes, of course, they have. But, those companies are not
typical start-ups. In the United States, the typical start-
up is a company capitalized with about $25,000 of the
founder’s savings that operates in retail or personal
services (Hurst and Lusardi 2004). Odds are pretty
good that it is a home-based business (Pratt 1999), and
the founder aspires to generate around $100,000 in
revenue in five years (Haynes 2001). The vast majority
of people founding new businesses aren’t entrepre-
neurs in the sense of people building companies that
grow, generating both jobs and wealth. Rather, they are
founding wage-substitution businesses that have more
in common with self-employment than with the
creation of high growth companies.1
This is not a U.S.-only phenomenon. Across the 34
countries in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
dataset, the typical start-up founded between 1998
and 2003 required $11,400 in capital. So even at the
time that SAP, or Google or EasyJet were founded,
they weren’t anything like the typical new business.
To get more economic growth by having more
start-ups, new companies would need to be more
productive than existing companies. But they are not.
Haltiwanger, Lane, and Speltzer (1999), combined
data from the U.S. Census and other sources to look
at the relationship between firm productivity and firm
age. The results showed that firm productivity
increases with firm age. This means that, at least in
the United States, the average new firm makes worse
use of resources than the average existing firm, which
is not what you would expect if economic growth
benefits more from the creation of new firms than
from the expansion of existing ones. And you
shouldn’t think that the typical start-up makes up
for its poor productivity when it gets older because
typical U.S. start-up is dead in five years.
This pattern makes sense because there should not
be positive correlation between economic growth and
the rate at which typical start-ups are formed over
the long term. As countries become wealthier, the rate
at which they create start-ups goes down. Societal
wealth leads average wages go up, which encourages
business owners to use machines to replace work that
1 Some observers have sought to distinguish between these
types of entrepreneurs by calling them ‘‘opportunity’’ and
‘‘necessity’’ entrepreneurs or by distinguishing between ‘‘self-
employment’’ and ‘‘entrepreneurship’’ (Henrekson 2007).
While I am sympathetic to the authors’ goal of getting
academics and policy makers to break out of a focus on
average and typical entrepreneurs, which underlies their
labeling, I don’t believe that these distinctions work. ‘‘Oppor-
tunity’’ and ‘‘necessity’’ entrepreneurship refer to the trigger
for starting a business. People can build high-growth, job-
creating, wealth-generating companies even if their motivation
for starting a business was necessity. Moreover, the majority of
‘‘opportunity’’ entrepreneurs are not interested in growing their
businesses, and fewer still manage to do so. The distinction
between ‘‘self-employment’’ and ‘‘entrepreneurship’’ fails
because many people who start businesses that generate
virtually no jobs or wealth have founded businesses that
employ others, making them more than just self-employed.




used to be done by hand. Capital (the machinery) is
subject to greater economies of scale – the reduction in
the cost of production that comes from generating
things in higher volume – than labor. As a result, the
increased use of capital leads companies to grow in size
and hire people who would otherwise have gone into
business for themselves (Niels Noorderhaven et al.
2004).
Moreover, when countries get wealthier and real
wages rise, the opportunity cost of running your own
business goes up because the amount of money that
you could have earned working for someone else
increases. This increased opportunity cost leads more
people to go to work for others than when real wages
were lower (Caree et al. 2002).
Finally, as countries get richer, they change where
economic value is created; first from agriculture to
manufacturing, and then from manufacturing to
services. Economist David Blau explained that as
the source of economic value shifts toward activities
where self-employment is less common, like manu-
facturing, from activities where self-employment is
more common, like agriculture, the proportion of
people running their own businesses drops (Blau
1987). In the United States, the decline in the
importance of agriculture to the overall economy
led to a decline in the unincorporated self-employ-
ment rates from 12 percent in 1948 to 7.5 percent in
2003 (Hippel 2004). Similar patterns can be seen in
most of the other OECD countries.
So if you want to find countries where there are a lot
of entrepreneurs, go to Africa or South America. As
Fig. 1 shows, the correlation across countries between
percent of a country’s gross domestic product that
comes from agriculture and the country’s level entre-
preneurial activity is 0.66, a pretty strong relationship.
Rich countries are richer than poor countries
because they had more economic growth in the past.
So, if we measure new business creation and
economic growth over a long enough horizon to see
real differences in economic growth between coun-
tries, the countries that have had consistently faster
economic growth (the rich ones), actually have
declining rates of new firm formation.
In fact, if we look at the correlations between rates
of new firm formation and economic growth over the
medium-to-long term, we see that firm formation
declines as economic growth increases. For instance,
the correlation between real GNP growth rates and
the rate of self-employment in France, West Ger-
many, and Italy between 1953 and 1987, and in
Sweden between 1962 and 1987 is negative (Bogen-
hold and Staber 1991), as is the correlation in the 19
OECD countries for which data are available from
1975 to 1996 (Blanchflower 2000).
We also have ample evidence that when govern-
ments intervene to encourage the creation of new
businesses, they stimulate more people to start new
companies disproportionately in competitive indus-
tries with lower barriers to entry and high rates of
failure. That’s because the typical entrepreneur is
very bad at picking industries and choosing the ones
that are easiest to enter, not the ones that are best for
start-up (Johnson 2004). Rather than picking indus-
tries in which new companies are most successful,
most entrepreneurs pick industries in which most
start-ups fail. In the United States, the correlation
across industries between start-up rates and failure
rates is a whopping 0.77. So by providing incentives
for people to start businesses in general, we provide
incentives for people to start the typical business,
which is gone in a few years.
And who is most likely to respond to those
incentives and start businesses? Not the best entre-
preneurs. We know that unemployed people are more
likely to start businesses than people who have jobs.
Why? Because they have less to lose by becoming
entrepreneurs; something economists call a lower
opportunity cost on their time. After all, it’s less










Fig. 1 The correlation across countries between the percent-
age of value-added in agriculture and total entrepreneurial
activity in 2004. Source: Calculated from data from the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor and the World Development Report
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watching daytime T.V., than if it is taking home a
paycheck from a job.
The problem is that people who are unemployed
also tend to perform worse when they start companies
than people who quit their jobs to start businesses,
probably because their hurdle for what kind of
business passes the hurdle to pursue is much lower.
So policies designed to increase the total number of
new businesses disproportionately attract the worst
entrepreneurs.
3 The job creation myth
Okay, new firm formation might not enhance eco-
nomic growth, but, as everyone knows, new firms
create more jobs than existing firms. As, John Case
(1995), commentator for Inc Magazine explained,
‘‘Most of the 20 million new jobs created during the
past 15 years came not from established giants, the
companies that had led America’s growth up till then.
The jobs came from companies that were smaller,
newer – or both. They came from that ‘independent
entrepreneurial sector’.’’
It turns out that Mr Case, and the others who make
the same argument, are wrong. Very few people work
in new firms. According to Acs and Armington
(2004), companies with at least one employee that are
less than two years old, account for only 1 percent of
all employment in the United States. By contrast,
companies with at least one employee that are more
than ten years old, account for 60 percent of all
employment in the United States.
But companies add and shed jobs every year. So
companies that didn’t exist last year can start and hire
employees, while firms in existence last year can add
jobs or lose them. So how many jobs do new
businesses create? Data provided on its website by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that
31,472,000 jobs were created in the United States
in 2004 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008). That year,
580,900 new firms with at least one employee were
started, each of which had an average of 3.8
employees. Thus, in 2004, new firms created
2,207,420 jobs in the United States, or 7 percent of
the total number of jobs created in that year.
This pattern is not limited to the United States.
Davidsson and Delmar (2000) found that only 1.7
percent of the ten year job growth of surviving firms
in Sweden was generated by firms two years old and
younger in the observation year. By contrast, 74.5
percent of the job growth was generated by compa-
nies ten or more years old.
Measuring net job creation – new jobs created
minus old jobs lost – is a whole lot harder than
measuring gross job creation. So we have fewer
estimates of it. But estimates of net job creation by
new firms are remarkably similar to the estimates of
gross job creation. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)
found that, in U.S. manufacturing, one year old firms
created 6.4 percent of the net new jobs, an estimate
that is consistent across industries, regions, firm size,
and type of firm ownership.
New firms account for a minority of gross and net
job creation. In fact, to get to 50 percent of net new jobs
that are created by new firms, you have to consider all
firms that are nine years old or less to be ‘‘new’’.
Anyone with children knows that nine-year-olds are
not ‘‘new’’ and pretty different from new born babies.
Okay, so every year a cohort of new firms is
founded that generates about 7 percent of the new
jobs created in that year. But how many jobs does that
cohort of firms account for in its second year? And
what about in its third year? And in all years after
that? On average, the answer is none. For instance,
Knaup (2005) found that the cohort of new employer
firms founded in the United States in 1998 employed
798,066 people in its first year, but employed only
670,111 people in 2002 (see Table 1). In other words,
the number of jobs lost by new firms that close down
in their second year, third year, fourth year, and so
on, exceeds the number of jobs added by the
expansion of the new firms that survive (Kirchhoff
1994; Persson 2004; Wagner 1994). Far from being
job creators, as a whole, new firms have net job
destruction after their first year.
Again, this is not just a U.S. phenomenon. Studies
conducted in Sweden and Germany also show that
each cohort of new firms employs more people in its
first year than it employs in any year after that
(Kirchhoff 1994; Persson 2004; Wagner 1994).
It also takes a lot of entrepreneurs to create lasting
jobs. To get one business employing at least one
person in ten years, we need 43 entrepreneurs to
begin the process of starting a company. And how
many jobs will that start-up have, on average, ten
years after it was founded? For the United States, the
answer is 9. In short, 43 people have to try to start
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companies so that we can have 9 jobs a decade from
now. That’s not the spectacular yield that you might
think we’d get if you read the press reports about the
job creation of start-ups.
So far we have talked about the jobs that start-ups
create as if they are the same as the jobs in existing
companies. But they are not. They are worse. Wagner
(1997) showed that jobs in new firms pay less, offer
worse fringe benefits, and provide less job security
than jobs in existing firms.
The data show that jobs in new firms are more
likely to be part-time than jobs in existing firms.
Moreover, jobs in the average new firm do not pay as
well as jobs in the average existing business.
Reynolds and White (1997) found that, in the United
States, the average new job paid 72 percent of the
average wage in the state in the firm’s first year and
that the wages in those firms were still below the state
average when they were four years old.
Jobs in new firms also offer fewer benefits than
jobs in existing firms. According to an analysis of the
Federal Reserve Board’s survey of small business
finances, U.S. businesses become more likely to offer
a pension plan or health insurance coverage to their
employees as they get older (Bernstein 2002).
The size of the difference in the tendency of new and
existing firms to offer health insurance is substantial. In
the United States, men who work for others are three
times as likely, and women who work for others are six
times as likely, to have health insurance, as those who
work for themselves (Wellington 2001). Moreover,
preliminary data from Kauffman Firm Survey show
that, in 2004, only 23.2 percent of new U.S. firms
offered health insurance to their full-time employees.
Jobs in new firms are also less likely to be around
in the future than jobs in existing businesses, largely
because the survival rate of new firms is so low. The
probability that jobs created by new firms in the
services sector in the United States would still be
around four years later was 10 to 13 percent lower
than the probability for all (new and established)
businesses in that sector. In manufacturing, the
numbers were worse. The probability that a job
created in a new firm would still be around four years
later was 20 percent below that of jobs created in all
firms (Armington and Acs 2003).
4 The policy solution
Clearly, creating typical start-ups isn’t the way to
enhance economic growth and create jobs. So what
is? It is pretty straightforward. Stop subsidizing the
formation of the typical start-up and focus on the
subset of businesses with growth potential. Getting
economic growth and jobs creation from entrepre-
neurs is not a numbers game. It is about encouraging
high quality, high growth companies to be founded.
The evidence on high-growth start-ups is consis-
tent. A tiny sliver of companies accounts for the vast
majority of the contribution to job creation and
economic growth that comes from entrepreneurial
activity. These gazelles more than make up for the
lack of job and wealth creation of the typical start-up
Table 1 Employment of the 1998 cohort of new employer firms in the United States
Sector 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Overall 798,066 792,131 781,506 721,103 670,111
Natural resources and mining 21,809 19,781 19,945 17,636 16,789
Construction 98,750 94,468 84,550 75,256 69,426
Manufacturing 45,670 51,271 52,055 50,073 45,732
Trade, transportation and utilities 139,125 140,472 137,448 127,135 118,266
Information 17,794 22,064 25,085 22,131 18,241
Financial activities 46,098 47,745 46,314 43,855 41,665
Professional and business services 137,908 154,160 170,016 158,281 147,618
Education and health services 57,068 64,594 67,017 65,534 64,881
Leisure and hospitality 156,668 139,041 126,323 114,154 105,941
Other services 69,736 55,664 49,639 45,027 39,932
Source: Adapted from Knaup (2005, pp. 50–56)
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(Henrekson and Johansson 2009). Moreover, because
many gazelles are fairly old and large at the time that
they become major wealth and job creators, the story
is even more extreme for start-ups. A very small
number of new companies account for a dispropor-
tionately large amount of wealth and job creation.
These companies are very difficult to pick out
ahead of time, making it hard to categorize them.
However, one dimension on which they can be
identified is their source of financing. According to
data from the National Venture Capital Association,
since 1970, U.S. venture capitalists have funded an
average of 820 new companies per year. These 820
start-ups – out of the more than two million
companies started in the United States every year –
have enormous economic impact. A report posted on
the Venture Impact website explains that, in 2003,
companies that were backed by venture capitalists
employed 10 million people, or 9.4 percent of the
private sector labor force in the United States, and
generated $1.8 trillion in sales, or 9.6 percent of
business sales in this country (Venture Impact 2004).
Moreover, in 2000, the 2,180 publicly companies that
received venture-capital backing between 1972 and
2000 comprised 20 percent of all public companies in
the United States, 11 percent of their sales, 13 percent
of their profits, 6 percent of their employees, and one-
third of their market value, a figure in excess of $2.7
trillion dollars (Gompers and Lerner 2001).
In short, the question is not whether having a large
number of typical start-ups is better than having a
small number of high-growth start-ups. The latter is
clearly better.
This pattern has important implications for policy
makers. Instead of just believing naively that all
entrepreneurship is good and developing policies to
increase the number of average or typical entrepre-
neurs, policy makers need to recognize that only a
select few entrepreneurs will create the businesses that
will take people out of poverty, encourage innovation,
create jobs, reduce unemployment, make markets
more competitive, and enhance economic growth.
Therefore, as unfair as it might sound, policy makers
need to ‘‘stop spreading the peanut butter so thin.’’2
They need to recognize that all entrepreneurs are not
created equal. They need to think like venture capital-
ists and concentrate time and money on extraordinary
entrepreneurs, and worry less about the typical ones.
That means identifying the select few new businesses,
out of the multitude of start-ups created each year,
which are more productive than existing companies,
and investing in them.
How? First, we need to reduce the incentives that
we give marginal entrepreneurs to start businesses by
reducing the transfer payments, loans, subsidies,
regulatory exemptions, and tax benefits that encour-
age more and more people to start businesses.
Because the average existing new firm is more
productive than the average new firm, we would be
better off economically if we got rid of policies that
encouraged a lot of people to start businesses instead
of taking jobs working for others.
Take, for example, the home office tax deduction
in the United States. Half of all new businesses are
home-based businesses. So people who start busi-
nesses that they operate out of their homes can deduct
the costs of using part of their homes for their
businesses – a deduction not available to them if they
work for someone else – which gives people an
incentive to start companies that do little to enhance
economic growth or to create new jobs.
Alternatively, consider the active labor market
policy in Germany, which seeks to turn unemployed
people into entrepreneurs. The German government
spends around $12 billion Euros per year on this
program (Baumgartner and Caliendo 2007). This
figure is not far off the $20 billion or so per year that
U.S. venture capital firms invest in start-up compa-
nies. But what does the German government get for
its investment? Certainly not companies that go
public, grow their sales, and create jobs the way that
the companies backed by U.S. venture capitalists do.
Instead, what they get is marginal businesses that
create few jobs and have high failure rates.
Or consider the situation in France. According to
one web site (Justlanded.com 2008): ‘‘There are over
250 different grants and subsidies … available to
individuals for starting up a personal enterprise or
small business in France, particularly in rural areas.
These include EU subsidies, central government
grants, regional development grants, redeployment
grants, and grants from departments and local com-
munities.’’ What does the French government get for
2 For European readers unaccustomed to the peanut butter and




these 250 different programs, other than employment
for a large number of government bureaucrats? It is
difficult to know for sure since no study has been
done on the companies backed by all of these grants
and subsidies, but the lack of easy-to-identify, high
growth, high employment-generating, post-IPO com-
panies that have been backed by these programs,
suggests that the returns have not been spectacular.
So what should policy makers be doing instead?
They should reallocate resources to programs that
support high growth companies. For instance, in the
United States, policy makers could shift money into
the Small Business Innovation Research Program,
which requires federal government agencies to set
aside a portion of their budgets to support commer-
cially viable R&D projects at small companies. The
recipients of these funds are much more likely than
the typical start-up to contribute to economic growth
and to create jobs.
In France, policy makers on the right track with the
50 percent R&D tax credit. Even when it is reduced to
30 percent in the third and subsequent years (Investin
France.org 2008), this R&D tax credit exceeds the on-
again-off-again 20 percent tax credit for U.S.-based
research and development expenditures. R&D tax
credits offer an incentive for entrepreneurs to conduct
research and development that they otherwise would
not undertake. Those new companies that conduct
R&D, and which would benefit from this credit, are
more likely than the typical start-up to contribute to
economic growth and job creation.
These are merely two few examples of policies we
could change. The general principle is to shift
resources from programs that support generic entre-
preneurship efforts to those that support high
potential businesses.
Some commentators argue that we cannot just
focus on the small number of highly successful start-
ups because we do not know which start-ups will
become high growth businesses and which won’t. To
these commentators, the answer is to throw mud
against the wall and see what sticks.
This view may be politically appealing, but it is
naı¨ve. It assumes that we cannot identify the things
that make new businesses more likely to survive,
generate profits, increase sales, and hire people.
Unless the beliefs of venture capitalists and sophis-
ticated business angels are completely wrong, we
know what criteria to focus on. Between the human
capital of the founder and his motivations, the
industries in which companies are founded, their
business ideas and strategies, and their legal forms
and capital structure, among other things, we have a
lot of information on which to choose likely winners
from likely losers.
In fact, most people know how to select the
companies to bet on. Take, for example, following
two businesses:
• A personal cleaning business that is started by an
unemployed high school drop out, that is pursuing
the customers of another personal cleaning busi-
ness, and is capitalized with $10,000 of the
founder’s savings.
• An Internet company that is started by a former
SAP employee with fifteen years of experience in
the software industry, an MBA and a master’s
degree in computer science, that is pursuing the
next generation of Internet search, and is capital-
ized with $250,000 in money from the founder
and a group of business angels.
Which one would you put your resources behind?
It’s obvious that the second business’ chances to
contribute to economic growth and create jobs are far
better than the first’s and that, on average, we would be
better off putting our resources into businesses like it.
In fact, policy makers know how to make this
choice too. Although skeptics often ask for examples
of public programs in which policy makers choose
companies to back and end up picking winners,
thinking that there are no examples, it turns out that
there are. Take the Small Business Investment Cor-
poration program in the United States as an example.
This program has used taxpayer dollars to support the
following companies, among others: America
OnLine; Amgen, Inc.; Apple Computer; Callaway
Golf Company; Compaq, Inc.; Costco; Cray
Research; DoubleClick.com; Duracraft Corporation;
Evergreen Solar, Inc; Extreme Networks, Inc; Federal
Express; Fusion Systems Corp; Gymboree Corpora-
tion; HealthSouth Rehabilitation; Intel Corp.; Jenny
Craig, Inc.; Outback Steakhouse; Peoplesoft, Inc.;
Radio One; Restoration Hardware, Inc.; Rock Bottom
Restaurants; Staples; Sun Microsystems; Wellfleet
Communications; and Wire Networks, Inc. (SBA.gov
2008). Most venture capitalists would be happy to
have had these companies in their portfolios. So why
are we encouraging and subsidizing the creation of
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marginal businesses instead of focusing government
resources on the high potential ones?
The fix to our failing public policies toward
entrepreneurship will take political will. There are
many more voters that directly benefit from our
current policies – they get subsidies and tax benefits
from starting companies – than would directly benefit
from a focus on high potential companies. The
greater benefits from the better policies are diffuse
and down the road because they come from having
more high growth, job creating companies. So policy
makers need to make a choice: do they want to pursue
good policies or good politics?
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